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COMMENT.
CAN THE LEGISLATURE IMPOSE UPON A STREET RAILWAY COMPANY
THE OBLIGATION TO PAVE BETWEEN ITS RAILS?
The limits of legislative control over public service corporations
having special franchises in the streets have not, as yet, been definitely
fixed by the decisions. A number of cases recently decided deal
with this subject, the particular point being whether a street railway
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company can be compelled to bear the expense of paving that part
of the street specially appropriated to its use.
One of these cases is that of the Fair Haven & Westzylle Railroad
Company v. New Haven, 53 Atl. 96o, decided in January, 1903. In
1895 an act was passed by the Connecticut legislature authorizing the
city of New Haven to issue bonds for the construction of permanent
pavements. All pavements were to be laid by the city, but the city was
directed to assess upon the street railway company the cost of paving
a strip nine feet in width for each line of track on the street. An
asphalt pavement was laid under this act, and the plaintiff company
was assessed for its proportionate share. In an appeal from this
assessment the constitutionality of the act was questioned by the
plaintiff.
In a clear and forcible opinion the court upholds the validity
of the act, and upon two grounds, the first of which is that the act
is a proper exercise of the police power. The reasoning of the
court is as follows: The establishment, maintenance and regulation
of highways is within the police power of the State. In the exercise
of this power the State, acting through its agents, may determine
what repairs are necessary and upon whom the burden should
reasonably fall. Such regulation must be reasonable and the bur-
dens must be reasonably cast, but the court will not interfere with
the legislative discretion except in a very clear case. In-the present
case there is no such apparent injustice in imposing upon the plaintiff
the cost of paving that portion of the street peculiarly appropriated
to its use as to justify the court in saying that constitutional powers
have been transgressed.
The other ground is that the act is 'valid as at. amendment of
the plaintiff's charter. The power to alter, amend or repeal the
charter was expressly reserved. While it is impossible to precisely
define the limits of this power of amendment, it is clear that it
extends so far as to authorize legislation imposing reasonable regu-
lations upon a corporation operating a railway in a public street as
to the condition of repair in which the street shall be kept, the
improvements which shall be made therein and the share of any
burden incident thereto which shall be borne by the corporation.
A similar law was upheld by the Supreme Court of Nebraska
in the case of Lincoln Street Railway Co. v. the City of Lincoln, 84
N. W. 802. decided in i-goI. This law required all street railway
companies to pave or repave between and to one foot beyond their
outer rails, whenever the street in which such rails were laid should be
ordered paved or repaved. Counsel for the city contended that this
law was valid either as an exercise of the taxing power, the police
power, or the reserve power to alter or amend the plaintiff's charter.
The 7otirt considers these various points and indicates its opinion
,hat sutch legislation may be sustained as an exercise of either the
taxing power or the police power. but it bases its conclusion upon
"the broad and fundamental doctrine of the right of the legislature
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to impose the burdens as a reasonable exercise of its reserve power"
to amend the charter.
The Court of Errors and Appeal in New Jersey, in the case of
Fielders v. N. Jersey Street Railway Co., 53 Atlantic 4o4, decided
in November, 19o2, deals with the question whether a municipal
ordinance imposing upon street railway companies the duty to pave,
repave and keep in repair a certain portion of the street, can be
properly classed as a police regulation. The validity of the ord&-
nance depended upon the answer to this question, as the city had
no charter authority to pass the ordinance except as a police regu-
lation. The court holds that such an ordinance is not a police
regulation, but an exercise of the power of taxation, and therefore
unauthorized by the. city charter. It will be noticed, however, that
this case does not deal with the power of the State to impose an
obligation to pave and repave.
The general railroad law of the State of New York, section 98,
requires every street railway company having tracks in the street
to "have and keep in permanent repair" that part of the street
between the rails and two feet outside "under the supervision of the
proper local authorities and whenever required by them to do so,
and in such manner as they may prescribe."
In the case of Conway v. Rochester, 157 N. Y. 33, decided in
1898, it was contended that this law did not impose an obligation
to repave, but the court held that an obligation to repave was
imposed. The power of the legislature to impose such an obligation
was not questioned by the respondent or touched upon by the court,
and this case, therefore, seems to concede that the legislature has
such power.
It is apparent from these decisions and others which might be
cited that the courts concede to the legislative arm of the government
full power to impose obligations upon street railway companies as
to the pavement, repavement or repair of such parts of streets as
are peculiarly appropriated to their use, and that such legislation is
justified either as an exercise of the police power or the reserve
power to alter, amend or repeal charters. John Hillard.
THE INCORPORATION OF TRADE UNIONS.
The recent finding of the jury against the Society under the de-
cision of the House of Lords in the case of the Taff Vale Ry. V. The
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, (19Ol) A. C. 426, is
affording an occasion for considerable comment on the part of the
public press, a comment, which it would seem, was somewhat tardy
when we recall that the decision itself was rendered in July, 19Ol.
It was then held that a trade union registered under the Trade
Union Acts of 1871 and 1876, though not a corporation, might be
sued in its registered name, and was collectively responsible for the
acts of its members. It has been referred to as the most important
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decision affecting the interests of labor since the celebrated case of
Allen v. Flood, (1898) A. C. I. It did not, however, enunciate any
new principle of law, not at least to the courts of this country. For
there would appear to be no valid reason for distinguishing between
a labor union and any other voluntary association in applying the
rule that a body is responsible for the authorized acts of its members.
The decision is important because its application of the prin-
ciple brings into prominence the general problem of securing a
greater responsibility from these organizations. For, though legally
liable in this country as well as in England, they have enjoyed a
practical immunity. Actions have been maintained against them,
but it has been almost impossible to reach their funds so as to sat-
isfy the judgment. For this reason it has been proposed that they
be incorporated, a proposition that is ardently advocated by the
friends of the union. Mr. Brandeis in an article on this subject in the
January number of the Green Bag says: "The unions should take
the position squarely that they are amenable to law, prepared to take
the consequences if they transgress, and thus show that they are in
full sympathy with the spirit of our people, whose political system
rests upon the proposition that this is a government of law, and
not of men."
The advantages to the union that would accrue from incorpora-
tion may be enumerated as follows:
I. It would do much to overcome the antagonism of the em-
ployer, because he would then have a responsible party with whom
to deal.
2. It would curb the use of the writ of injunction.
3. It would restrain its members from committing those acts
of violence which always alienate public sympathy and thus impede
the success of strikes.
4. And it would enable .the union to show that the illegal acts
alleged were not committed by its members, but by strike sympa-
thizers or general law breakers, whereas at present the adjudication
is generally ex parte, no opportunity being given for investigation
or cross examination.
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY COMPULSORY PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF
PRISONER.
In absence of a specific constitutional provision that a prisoner
shall not be compelled to give incriminating evidence against him-
self, how far may a defendant in a criminal prosecution be com-
pelled to submit to physical examination and thereby furnish self-
criminating evidence?
It is well settled that he need not incriminate himself by verbal
statements or confessions; but the boundary line beyond which the
prosecuting attorney may not pass in his extracting evidence from
the prisoner's clothing or person-in particular, discovery of con-
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cealed marks of identification-is not well defined. Nor is it fully-
settled in what classes of cases the court may or may not order
medical experts to examine a prisoner for the prosecution's benefit
or compel him to exhibit himself to a jury.
These are questions raised in the recent case of State v. Height,
91 N. W. 935. The Supreme Court of Iowa (delivering its opinion
through judge Emlin McClain) seems to have experienced no little
difficulty in arriving upon ground where it could "supply and en-
force one of the most fundamental of all constitutional safeguards,
which, for some reason, was omitted from the Iowa charter of lib-
erties"--viz: the principle that no person "shalr be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." (Vide Const. U.
S., 5th Amendm't; Const. Iowa, Art. I, sec. 9; 56 Cent. Law Jour-
nal, 93, note.) In this case the prisoner, charged with rape of a
child, had communicated to her the venereal disease with which he
was found to be infected. The trial court admitted the testimony
of the physicians who had made the examination of the prisoner
in- the jail. On appeal the Supreme Court held that such admission
was error.
In the absence of the specific prohibition in the constitutional bill
of rights or statutes securing the citizen from such practical self-
accusation, the Court, to uphold the principle, resorted to a very
broad and liberal interpretation of the clause "'No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,"
emphasizing the necessity of maintaining the fundamental principles
of legal procedure existing in this country prior to the adoption of
federal and State constitutions. The court say: "The rule against
requiring a witness to give self-criminating evidence in any judicial
proceeding is much older than our constitution. It is one of the
fundamentals of the common law. The rule its-elf and the reasons
for it are thus stated by an eminent authority: 'Upon a principle
of humanity, as well as of policy, every witness is protected from
answering questions by doing which he would criminate himself,-
of policy, because it would place the witness under the strongest
temptation to commit the crime of perjury; and of humanity, be-
cause it would be to extort a confession of the truth by a kind of
duress, every species of which the law abhors.' i Starkie, Ev. 41."
The Court also insist that this rule is implied under the general
guaranty of due process of law. "If such guaranty is not thus to
be implied * * * there would be nothing unconstitutional in
a statute which should restore torture by the thumbscrew or the
boot as a legitimate means of securing evidence in a criminal prose-
cution."
The following tests and examinations have been upheld in the
courts: In Iowa, ordering prisoner to stand up in the courtroom
for purposes of identification (State v. Reasby, 69 N. W. 45) ; in
Louisiana, compelling accused to take his feet from under a chair
(State v. Prudhomme, 25 La. Ann. 523); in Nevada, the compul-
sory exhibition in court of a forearm to reveal tattoo marks (State
COMMENT.
v. Ah Chuey, 33 Am. Rep. 530) ; in North Carolina, the exhibition
of a hand alleged to have been burned (State v. Garrett, 17 Am. Rep.
I) ; in Pennsylvania, the propriety of requesting prisoner to repeat
certain words that the sound of his voice might be heard (Johnson
v. Coin., 9 Ati. 78) ; and in Texas, the requirement to make foot-
prints in an ash heap (Walker v. State, 32 Am. Rep. 595).
On the other hand the following offered evidence has been held
inadmissible: In Georgia, testimony of results of forcibly placing
defendant's foot in certain tracks (Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667), the
compulsory exhibition to a jury of the stump of an amputated leg
(Blackwell v. State, 44 Am. Rep. 717), and testimony of forcible
taking by an officer of a prisoner's shoes and comparing with tracks
(Myers v. State, 25 S. E. 252) ; in Michigan, the requirement that
defendant try on a shoe (People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228); in New
York, evidence of recent delivery of a child obtained by forcible
examination by medical experts, acting under trial court's order, of
a female defendant charged with murder of a bastard child (People
v. McCoy, 45 How. Prac. 216) ; in Tennessee, held improper for the
prosecuting attorney to place a pan of mud before jury and request
the defendant to make tracks in it (Stokes v. State, 30 Am. Rep. 72) ;
in Wasfiington, held that an accused person "cannot be compelled
to exhibit those portions of his body which are usually covered, for
the purpose of securing identification, or in any other ways affording
evidence against him" (State v. Nordstrom, 35 Pac. Rep. 382).
On the whole, it may be said that the courts generally stand
against the invasion of personal privilege and the right of immunity
from coerced exhibition or forcible inspection, notwithstanding the
fact that the rigor of the old criminal law which gave reason to the
rule has largely passed away. At times, it would seem, where there
is a dearth of positive evidence which an examination of the pris-
oner's person would in all probability reveal, strict construction of
this rule of privilege results in unnecessarily obstructing common
justice; and in extreme cases the unjudicial mind is willing to tol-
erate summary punishment at the hands of the community rather
than trust either the courts or the legislature.
UNCERTAINTY OF BENEFICIARIES IN CHARITABLE TRUSTS.
There is a great diversity of opinion in the United States as to
the degree of uncertainty or indefiniteness admissible in the bene-
ficiaries of a charitable trust. There may perhaps be said to be
three different classes: (I) In those States where the statute 43
Elizabeth is recognized, great liberality in this respect is generally
allowed, and trusts are seldom declared void however indefinite the
beneficiaries may be, provided a power of appointment Is vested
somewhere, following the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi
potest; (2) In other States the construction is much more strict;
(3) while in some States no distinction in regard to the beneficiaries
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is made between charitable and other trusts. It is-the very uncer-
tainty of the beneficiaries which gives jurisdiction in chancery.
State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Ch. 392; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 589.
And the better and more cerrect view would seem to be that though
the persons to be benefited constitute a very large number and may
possibly include all mankind, still the trust may be sustained if its
purpose is sufficiently designated in the instrument creating it.
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539; George v. Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq.
757, 14 Am. St. 754; Thornton v. Howe, 31 Beav. 14; Perry, Ttusts,
sec. 7o5. The donor may, however, appoint trustees, and invest
them with discretion to apply the fund toward a charitable purpose
specified, leaving them in its application, to select from numerous
persons or institutions which shall receive the bounty, or the testator
may specify the charitable purpose in terms so general that the
trustees must necessarily exercise a discretion in determining which
of many purposes falling within the general description they shall
seek to accomplish. Whether, in such a case, courts of equity in this
country retain authority over the trust so as to control- its adminis-
tration and make it certain, and thereby declare it a valid charitable
trust, is a question upon which the courts are irreconcilably divided.
The majority of them perhaps maintain that courts of chancery as a
part of their judicial power possess authority to so far control the
administration of the trust as to compel trustees to execute it within
the limits of the discretion conferred upon them, and the trust may
be sustained. Tappan v. Deblois, 45 Me. 122; Swasey v. Amer. Soc.,
57 Me. 523; Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348; Chambers v. St. Louis,
29 Mo. 543; Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Acad. of Science, 94 Mo. 459;
Murphy's Estate, 184 Pa. St. 3o; Att'y Gen. v. Wallace, 7 B. Mon.
611 ; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana 354.
In this connection two interesting recent cases in Kentucky are
worthy of notice. The court in Thompson's Ex'r. v. Brown, 70
S. W. 674, held a bequest in trust to be "distributed to the poor"
void for indefiniteness of beneficiaries; and yet in Coleman v.
O'Leary's Ex'r., 7o S. W. io68, the same court held that a bequest
in trust "for the establishment of a home for poor men" was not
uncertain and that the trustees would act under the authority of the
chancellor. The former case apparently overrules the long settled
doctrine in Kentucky, both as quoted by text book writers an& as
understood in its previous decisions. See 2 Perry on Trusts, sec.
748; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 905-912. It is difficult to understand
how the court if it follows its line of reasoning can hold the trust in
Coleman v. O'Leary, supra, valid if the bequest in Thompson v.
Brown is void. One apparently is as indefinite as the other, and if
the latter is valid it certainly involves a marvellous degree of dis-
crimination into the quantum of indefiniteness that will render a
charitable trust invalid. Likewise with former decisions of the
same court it is impossible to reconcile the doctrine in Thompson v.
Brown. In Curling v. Curling, 8 Dana 38 , Robertson, C. J., said:
"As the testator has manifested an intention to dedicate his estate
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to one specified class of objects embraced by the statute, if his
bounty can be applied to any single object within that class, con-
sistently with his declared purpose, and without the hazard of violat-
ing his will or- making a will for him, there is no doubt that it is a
trust which may be lawfully executed, and judicially upheld and en-
forced." And in Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana 354, .365, said the same
judge: "When an ascertainable object is designated by the donor in
general or collective terms, or when a person is appointed by himto
elect a described portion or kind from a designated class, the chancel-
lor ivill interpose on the ground of trust." Why, therefore, in this
case of a bequest "to be distributed to the poor" is the class not
sufficiently designated that the beneficiaries cannot be selected so as
not to violate or to make a will for the testator? And if in Coleman
v. O'Leary, the- court determines that a home for poor men in
the district of the trustee will carry out the testator's intention,
why could not a similar administration be made of the bequest
"to the poor?"
The court bases its decision on Spalding v. IndustriaI School,
54 8. W. 2oo (Ky.), a bequest "for charitable objects," which was
held invalid for uncertainty. While with more reason perhaps, it
may be said that no designated class is referred to in "charitable
objects," still a bequest "to the poor" is to such a designated class that
it is not the same as one to "charitable objects.". A gift for the
benefit of the poor in general has been upheld in many cases. Vidal
v. Girard, 2 How. 127; Darcy v. Kelly, 153 Mass. 433; Bullard v.
Chandler, 149 Mass. 532; State v. McDonough, 8 La. Ann. 171;
Nash v. Morley, 5 Beav. 177; Att'y.-Gen. v. Clarke, Amb. 422;
Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539;
Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51. And the famous statute
of 43 Eliz. in enumerating "the pious and godly uses" to which
it applies, employs no more definite descriptions than the following:
"relief of the aged." "maintenance of sick and disabled 'soldiers
and marines," "the marriage of poor maids." "the supportation of
tradesmen and handicraftsmen," and that of "persons decayed." In
many cases a high degree of indefiniteness of beneficiaries has been
supported. A gift for "indigent, unmarried, Protestant females"
is valid. Tappan's App., 52 Conn. 412. And likewise a gift "for the
greatest relief of human suffering, human want, and the good of
the greatest number." Everett v.Carr, 59 Me. 334. And a gift to
assist, relieve and benefit poor and necessitous persons will be upheld.
Sitter v. Hilliard,- 132 Mass. 412; Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass. 431.
Or a devise to be applied "to the dissemination of the gospel at
home and abroad" is valid, as being sufficiently certain. Att'y.-Gen.
v. Wallace, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 611; Kinney v. Kinney, 86 Ky. 61o,
6 S. W. 593.
On the other hand, the cases where such bequests as to the poor
in general have been held invalid are principally in what may be
termed "strict construction" States, or States where no distinction
is made between charitable and private trusts. Thus a bequest for
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"foreign missions and poor saints" has been held void for uncer-
tainty. Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 26. And so a
bequest of money to be distributed among "needy poor and respect-
able" widows is void. Galley v. Att'y. Gen., 3 Leigh (Va.) 450.
And in New York (until statute 1893), North Carolina, Marylanf,
Michigan, Virginia, and Wisconsin it has been declared that the
statute 43 Eliz. did not extend to this country.
But inasmuch as Kentucky has always allowed a very high
degree of indefiniteness in beneficiaries of charitable bequests, and
the Statute 43 Eliz. is almost bodily incorporated into the statutes,
and the court professes to follow and not overrule the former
decisions it would seem that it was incorrectly held that a bequest
"to the poor" is invalid.
